During WWII, the British Army set up and armed Chinese guerrillas who did live at that time inside the colonies of the Commowealth in order to fight against the presence of Japan.
Eventually, the guerrillas turned out to claim their own ahrence to Mao Tse Tung, and started professing their independence from Mother Country.
In 1950, the MPLA (Malayan Peoples Liberation Army) started to undermine the British interests.
What emerged from that specific period is that conventional military strategies proved to be sterile, especially in countering the insurgents.
As a matter of fact, British Army used to stay extremely – and cautiously – stick to their Basic Field Manuals.
Nonetheless, the presence of two brand new factors – the jungle and a rapid and sneaky enemy perfectly familiar with that environment – did start make a huge difference since the very beginning.
The situation quickly required the development of a new strategy, based on the training of small patrols from Special Air Service (SAS): their task was to penetrate and take advantage of all the jungle and thick areas under the MPLA.
In order to achieve this goal in a short period of time, the British Army started to employ native trackers (Iban), who lived in Sarawak ( Borneo Island).
As para-military force, The Sarawak Rangers were established in 1862 by the second Rajah of Sarawak, Charles Anthony Johnson Brooke. Their task was to protect the borders and fight any guerrilla operation.
In 1948, an original group of 49 Trackers were deployed in Malaya in order to defect and beat down the guerrilla insurgency of communist terrorists. Their exceptional Tracking Skills, infact, were extremely precious in that inhospitable jungle.
The success of their operations led to the former para-military Iban Trackers were formed again as the Sarawak Rangers – under the guide of Lt Col C.J Baird (January, 1st, 1953).
Back in 1942, the presence of natives as field guides and Scouts was highly recommended by U.S. Army:
“[…] A commander of any expedition into tropical country should at once take steps to avail himself of the assistance of natives of that area as guides, cargadores, scouts, and native auxiliaries. […] Their familiarity with the terrain and their knowledge of the people and the language will compensate for limited training. The use of native troops, organized and controlled by the commander of the expeditionary force, not only will help to lessen any objection to the presence of our forces, but will strengthen solidarity against common enemy […]” – U.S. Jungle Warfare – Basic Field Manual
The British Army understood the potentialities of the following tacticts, and soon adopted them:
- moving quickly and concelead in the jungle thanks to the knowledge of Natives about existing trails
- making ambushes taking advantage of the natural conformation of the terrain and the presence of lush vegetation
- making close encounter with the enemy trough the establishments of OBS well hidden
- strenous follow ups through the application of both Tracking and Antitracking principles (as we will soon figure out how)
“[…] These wars were fought in hostile landscapes, where the locals knew the terrain, and like the Boers were able to conduct local guerrillas […] Soon the tide of the war began to turn against the insurgents […]” – Ian Maxwell, Manhunter, The Art of Tracking, 2016
Thickness. Darkness. Presence of poisonous insects and snakes. A hardly bearable level of humidity. The Green Hell.
If Sarawak Trackers used to be extremely familiar with all the factors that turned that triple-canopy jungle to be a real “green hell”, the British were not.
In fact, making the way inside the dense vegetation and conducting patrols which could last per days, caused fatigue, blisters, even, in worst cases, “Immersion Foot”.
But that unconventional warfare happened to be the most effective one to get close to the insurgents, who were able to literally move like uncatchable ghosts in the jungle.
After a decade of warfare, the British troops dominated the guerrillas, by fighting in their own territory through the adoption of their own strategies. A new Federation was born, The Malaysian Federation, which comprised Malaya, Sabah, Brunei and Sarawak.
The SAS Troops proved to be not only avid but also quick learners, and effective practioners.
Thanks to the presence of local guides, they soon apprehended how to read tracks in an unfamiliar scenario, mostly made of dumping ground, roots, and vines.
The so defined ground spoors – if not easily detected due the massive presence of intricate vegetation, could be confirmed by aerial spoors. In few words, any disturbance made by the upper part of the body, corresponding from ankles to head, or even hats or the very top of backpacks.
An upside down leaf, a bended twig, a broken spider webs: all these small but consistent signs made up the “real intelligence” of the Small Units.
In the very same manner, by reading other’s tracks, the British understood how to minimize any signs of their passage.
They avoided to leave a clear footprint with the pattern of their shoes on nude terrain (“Track Traps”).
They pulled away any branch they didn’t need to bend.
They bended what they didn’t have to cut.
And the naturally broke with their hands what they could avoid to cut with their machete.
All the above mentioned actions, along with the elimination of any unnecessary fire they could started, ended up to become a cornerstone inside their next SAS Field Manuals.
They passed to History as “The British Antitracking Principles”.
Guest Author
Kyt Lyn Walken is the official European representative and instructor for Hull’s Tracking School (Virginia, USA), and she is a certified Conservation Ranger for C.R.O.W. (Conservation Rangers Operations Worldwide). She has been an outdoors and tracking enthusiast since childhood. She is free lance writer for several magazines based in US and UK. Kyt lives and works in Europe even if she often travels overseas, and can be contacted at www.man-tracking.com
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